India’s Civil Nuclear Law Reform:

India is revising its civil nuclear laws—the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), 1962 and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA), 2010—to:

• Attract private and foreign investment

  Accelerate clean energy deployment

  Advance technological innovation (especially Small Modular Reactors, or SMRs)

  Strengthen energy security and meet net-zero goals by 2070

Current Legal Bottlenecks

1. Atomic Energy Act, 1962

• Centralizes all nuclear operations under the government, excluding private and foreign players

  Prohibits private reactor ownership and export of nuclear material/technology

  Limits collaborative R&D and access to modern reactor designs

2. CLNDA, 2010

• Section 17(b) allows operators to sue suppliers for nuclear accidents

  International firms see it as an open-ended liability risk

  Discourages foreign partnerships, technology imports, and insurance backing

Proposed Reforms

1.Revising the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (2010)

• Limiting Supplier Liability: Under draft amendments, Section 17(b) will be restructured to cap supplier liability to the contract value, with clear time limits—bringing it in line with global standards and reducing open-ended risk

  Clarifying 'Supplier' Definition: The definition will be narrowed to protect smaller equipment makers from blanket liability unless explicitly mentioned in contracts

  Goal: Attract U.S., French, and Japanese firms like GE-Hitachi and Westinghouse that are currently staying away due to unfettered legal exposure

2. Amending the Atomic Energy Act (1962)

• Opening the Market: Private Indian firms—and in future likely foreign firms—will be allowed to build, own, and operate nuclear plants, ending the exclusive state monopoly

  Foreign Equity: The potential for minority foreign stakes (up to ~49%) is being explored, enabling firms like Westinghouse, EDF, and Rosatom to participate .

3. Policy Support

• ₹20,000 crore allocated in Union Budget 2025

  Launch of “Nuclear Energy Mission for Viksit Bharat”

  Focus on innovation, coordination, and SMR development

Why This Matters

1. Unlocking Investment & Technology

   • Caps and clarity in liability laws will revive stalled deals (e.g., EDF’s Jaitapur, Westinghouse’s Kovvada) and attract global nuclear tech leaders

2. Boosting Nuclear Capacity

   • These reforms support India’s ambition to grow from ~8 GW today to 100 GW by 2047, realizing its clean energy goals

3. SMRs & R&D Momentum

   • The budget includes ₹20,000 crore for Small Modular Reactors, targeting 5 indigenous units by 2033, with U.S. firms already cleared for tech transfers (e.g., Holtec)

4. Trade & Strategic Leverage

   • Aligning with the Convention on Supplementary Compensation and incorporating U.S., French, and Japanese partners is seen as a keystone in wider trade negotiations

Why Suppliers Are Worried

1. Unlimited Exposure
   Unlike international norms that limit liability to the plant operator, India’s Section 17(b) permits recourse even for latent defects or “sub-standard services”
   Foreign vendors like Westinghouse (U.S.) and Framatome (France) have repeatedly flagged this clause as a deal-breaker due to its unbounded liability

2. Broad Definition of “Supplier”
   India’s CLNDA doesn’t distinguish between major contractors and small sub-vendors This means even minor equipment suppliers, such as Indian manufacturers, could be held liable—creating widespread industry apprehension

3. Legal Ambiguity with Section 46
   This section allows additional civil claims under tort law beyond the CLNDA framework. Suppliers thus face potential unlimited civil liability, even if operators’ liability is capped

Dangers and Criticism in India’s Civil Nuclear Reforms

1. Dispersing Accountability — Weakening Supplier Liability

• The proposed loosening of Section 17(b) in the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA) aims to limit vendor liability for nuclear damage.

  Critics, including civil society and watchdogs, fear this might lead to:

  • Reduced responsibility for equipment suppliers, especially foreign firms.

  • Potential risk to communities if defective parts or malpractices cause nuclear accidents.

  • Historical precedents like Fukushima remind the world of catastrophic fallout when accountability is unclear.

  The trade-off here is between investor comfort and public safety—a delicate balance that critics feel might tilt too far towards protecting businesses at the expense of citizens.

2. Democratic Oversight and Transparency Deficits

• Unlike major infrastructure projects, the nuclear amendments have lacked wide public consultation.

  Key stakeholders—affected communities, scientific experts, and environmental groups—argue for:

  • A more transparent parliamentary process.

  • Inclusion of civil society in debates and decision-making.

  • Comprehensive scientific risk assessments shared publicly.

  Without such openness, reforms risk eroding public trust and invite skepticism about whether economic convenience is prioritized over safety.

India’s Need to Increase Its Nuclear Capacity

Current and Future Capacity Goals:

• India aims to raise its nuclear power capacity from the present 8,180 MW to 22,480 MW by 2031-32, and ultimately reach 100 GW by 2047.

Rising Energy Demand:

• With India’s electricity demand projected to grow 4 to 5 times by 2047, nuclear energy is critical to meeting the base-load power demand alongside renewable sources like solar and wind.

Climate and Energy Targets:

• India is committed to reducing its GDP emission intensity by 44% by 2030 (compared to 2005 levels).

  It targets 50% of its installed power capacity to come from non-fossil fuel sources by 2030, including nuclear energy.

India’s Three-Stage Nuclear Program

1st Stage: Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs)

• Use natural uranium (U-238) fuel with heavy water (deuterium oxide) as coolant and moderator.

  Currently operated by NPCIL, with 22 commercial reactors totaling 6,780 MWe capacity.

2nd Stage: Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs)

• Use Uranium-Plutonium Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel.

  Breed plutonium (Pu-239) from Uranium-238 and transmute Thorium-232 to fissile Uranium-233 for 3rd stage fuel.

  India’s Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) under BHAVINI is a flagship project; India will be the 2nd country after Russia with a commercial FBR.

  Benefits include better fuel utilization, reduced nuclear waste, and passive safety features with cost competitiveness.

3rd Stage: Thorium-Based Reactors

• Focus on utilizing abundant Indian Thorium reserves via Advanced Heavy Water Reactors (AHWR) using Uranium-233.

  Integral to India’s long-term energy sustainability and carbon reduction goals.

Legislative and Regulatory Framework

Atomic Energy Act (AEA), 1962

• Grants exclusive central government authority to produce and regulate atomic energy.

  Controls the sector via Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and NPCIL, restricting private participation.

Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA), 2010

• Establishes a no-fault liability regime where nuclear operators are primarily liable, capped at ₹1,500 crore (~$180 million).

  Government covers excess damages up to 300 million SDRs.

  Includes operator’s right of recourse against suppliers under specific conditions.

  Provides structured claims adjudication and excludes civil courts to streamline compensation.

  Crucial to enabling Indo-U.S. civil nuclear cooperation.

Conclusion

A historic shift in India’s nuclear policy, marked by Legal and regulatory reforms that will remove obstacles to private and foreign investment. It will access to advanced nuclear technologies through international partnerships, particularly with the U.S. It is also a significant expansion of India’s clean energy portfolio, reinforcing energy security and environmental commitments and Strengthening of the strategic civil nuclear cooperation framework with the U.S., aligning economic and geopolitical interests.