Growing Nuclear Threat

Global concern over nuclear security has intensified following the expiry of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the United States and Russia. With the lapse of the last major bilateral arms-control agreement between the world’s two largest nuclear powers, fears are rising that the international system may be entering a renewed and unconstrained nuclear arms race.

The absence of binding limits on strategic arsenals threatens global stability at a time when geopolitical rivalries are already deepening.

Rising Global Threat Perceptions

A Shifting Security Landscape

Global threat perceptions have risen sharply as great-power competition intensifies and the post–Cold War order erodes. The weakening of cooperative security frameworks has amplified mistrust and accelerated military modernisation.

Long-standing arms-control norms are deteriorating, reducing predictability and transparency in strategic affairs.

Return of Power Politics

Irredentism, neo-imperial ambitions, and assertive nationalism are reshaping global politics. Military force is increasingly used as an instrument of coercion, while diplomacy struggles to manage fast-evolving crises.

The resurgence of rivalry among major powers has increased the probability of both direct confrontations and proxy conflicts across multiple regions.

Nuclear Risks and Strategic Instability

The erosion of arms-control agreements has heightened perceptions of existential threat. Nuclear-armed states—including the United States, Russia, China, Israel, and Pakistan—are expanding or upgrading their arsenals.

With key treaties expiring and no credible replacements in sight, transparency has diminished and confidence-building measures have weakened. This raises the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation.

Regional Insecurity Hotspots

West Asia

Shifting alliances and latent nuclear ambitions contribute to regional volatility.

Eastern Europe

Ongoing war, territorial disputes, and military escalation have heightened nuclear anxieties.

East Asia

Strategic competition, particularly involving China and the United States, is redefining deterrence dynamics and accelerating arms build-ups.

Evolution of Strategic Arms Control

START-I

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-I) was signed in 1991 between the United States and the former USSR and came into force in 1994. It limited each side to 6,000 nuclear warheads and 1,600 delivery vehicles, but expired in 2009.

SORT (Treaty of Moscow)

The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) replaced START-I, but provided less stringent verification mechanisms.

New START

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, signed in 2010 and effective from 2011, capped deployed strategic warheads at 1,550 per side, with strict limits on missiles, bombers, and launchers. It included robust verification and inspection provisions.

Its expiry removes the last remaining bilateral constraint on nearly 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons.

Impact of New START’s Expiry

The lapse of New START eliminates formal limits on US and Russian arsenals. Both countries are pursuing extensive nuclear modernisation programs, raising the possibility of rapid warhead expansion.

Without transparency mechanisms, mutual suspicion may intensify, increasing instability and reducing crisis predictability.

A Widening Nuclear Landscape

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), as of January 2025, nine nuclear-armed states possess approximately 12,241 warheads.

Beyond the US and Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel have expanded or modernised their arsenals.

China, with roughly 600 warheads, has the fastest-growing arsenal and is constructing hundreds of missile silos. India has overtaken Pakistan in estimated warhead numbers.

These trends indicate that any future arms-control framework excluding China is unlikely to be effective.

Need for a Multilateral Disarmament Mechanism

Strengthening the NPT

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) legally obliges its 191 member states to pursue nuclear disarmament. The upcoming Review Conference presents an opportunity for renewed commitments.

However, growing nuclear ambitions in multiple regions highlight the limitations of a framework that lacks universal compliance.

Role of the TPNW

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) comprehensively bans nuclear weapons and provides a strong moral and legal framework.

Although nearly 100 countries have signed and around 70 have ratified it, no nuclear-armed state has joined, limiting its immediate strategic impact.

The Myth of Absolute Deterrence

Possession of nuclear weapons does not eliminate conflict. Low-intensity clashes, such as those between India and Pakistan, continue despite deterrence.

Nuclear weapons introduce a constant risk of catastrophic escalation, especially under hyper-nationalistic leadership where crisis decision-making can become unpredictable.

Thus, deterrence reduces large-scale war risk but does not eliminate instability.

Suggested Measures for Global Stability

Expand Arms Control Beyond Bipolarity

Future frameworks must move beyond US–Russia centrism by formally including China and gradually integrating other nuclear-armed states. Differentiated obligations may be necessary due to asymmetric arsenals.

Adopt a Risk-Reduction First Approach

Immediate disarmament may be unrealistic. Instead, states should prioritize:

• De-alerting nuclear forces

• No-first-use commitments

• Clear nuclear doctrines

• Nuclear risk-reduction centres

Strengthen Verification Through Technology

AI-assisted monitoring, satellite imagery, and remote sensing can enhance transparency. A multilateral verification body under UN or IAEA oversight would reduce dependence on bilateral trust.

Address Emerging Technologies

Future agreements must include hypersonic weapons, cyber threats to nuclear command systems, AI-enabled platforms, and space assets. Preventing cyberattacks on nuclear command-and-control systems is particularly crucial.

Depoliticise Arms Control

Arms control should be insulated from daily geopolitical crises. Track II and Track 1.5 diplomacy involving scientists and former officials can sustain dialogue even during tensions.

Conclusion: A Critical Juncture for Global Security

The expiry of New START underscores the fragility of global nuclear restraint mechanisms. Without renewed commitment to arms control, the world risks entering a destabilising and expensive nuclear arms race.

This moment presents an opportunity for a fresh, inclusive, and multilateral approach to disarmament.

Sustained leadership by major nuclear powers, strengthened verification systems, and global diplomatic pressure are essential to ensure that nuclear weapons do not continue to dominate the future of international security.